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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, as an appeal from a 
final Order and Judgment of a District Court. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. What legal standard is applicable to a 
consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict? 
2. Do the facts of this case meet the legal 
standards for granting a JNOV? 
3. Was the jury's verdict of no cause of action 
supported by any substantial evidence? 
4. May punitive damages be awarded in a case in 
which defendant's actions were all taken in accordance with the 
advice of counsel and in which no evidence of the relative 
wealth of the parties was presented? 
CONTROLLING RULES, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
This appeal rests substantially on Rule 50(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For the convenience of the Court, citations to the 
court record will be referred to as "R"; citations to the 
transcript of the trial will be referred to as "T"; and the 
transcript of the hearing on plaintiff1s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict as "T of H". 
A. General Nature of the Case. 
This action arises from a worker's compensation claim 
filed by plaintiff's husband, James Turner. The claim was 
adjusted by defendant General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (GAB). 
GAB became suspicious of the validity of the claim and employed 
Inteldex Corporation (Inteltech) to investigate. 
An under cover investigation was conducted. 
Inteltech investigators appeared at Mr. Turner's worker's 
compensation hearing and testified regarding what they had 
learned. Upon questioning by the administrative law judge, 
both Mr. and Mrs. Turner affirmed that everything the Inteltech 
people had testified to was true. 
Following the worker's compensation hearing and a 
denial of Mr. Turner's claim for benefits, Mr. and Mrs. Turner 
sued GAB, Inteltech, and certain Inteltech employees. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
As initially filed, plaintiff's Complaint included a 
number of claims that were dismissed before trial. All of Mr. 
Turner's claims against all defendants were voluntarily 
dismissed. (R. 894-896.) 
The trial proceeded upon plaintiff's claim for fraud, 
invasion of privacy, conspiracy and punitive damages. At the 
close of evidence, plaintiff's claims against two Inteltech 
employees, Ronnie Hyer and Denis Dye, were also voluntarily 
dismissed. (T. 894-896.) 
-2-
Trial by jury took place March 12-14, 1990. 
Following deliberations, the jury returned a unanimous verdict 
in favor of defendants. It answered the special verdict form 
questions as follows: 
1. By clear and convincing evidence, did 
the defendant Inteltech commit fraud 
upon the plaintiff, Jackie Turner, as 
that cause of action has been 
explained in these instructions? 
ANSWER: No. 
2. By a preponderance of the evidence, 
did the defendant Inteltech invade the 
privacy of the plaintiff Jackie Turner 
as that cause of action has been 
explained in these instructions? 
ANSWER: No. 
R. 721-722. 
Following the jury's verdict, plaintiff moved for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. On May 
4, 1990, the matter was argued before the Court. Judge 
Wilkinson denied the motion for new trial but granted the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (R. 813.) 
The Court entered judgment against GAB, Inteltech and Oak 
Norton jointly and severally for the following damages: 
Out-of-Pocket Damages: $ 20.00 
General Damages 5,000.00 
Punitive Damages 3,000.00 
Total Damages 8,020.00 
(R. 890-982.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Workerfs Compensation Claim 
1. GAB was the adjusting company handling Mr. 
Turner's worker's compensation claim. By September of 1986, 
the adjuster in charge had become suspicious of the validity of 
the claims due to conflicts between the medical reports and 
what the Turners were telling the adjuster. (T. 133, 215, 
233-234.) 
2. In September of 1986, GAB employed Inteltech 
to investigate Mr. Turner. (T. 133.) 
3. Mrs. Turner had been involved with the 
worker's compensation claim from the start. She was the one 
who had filled out the original claim form (T. 3 05), she had 
numerous conversations with the GAB adjusters regarding the 
claim (T. 235, 259, 291), she even picked up checks from GAB 
for interim compensation payments (T. 3 06). 
4. Mrs. Turner admitted at trial that she told 
GAB at least some things that were not true regarding her 
husband's condition. She told them that he was unable to work 
at a time when he was working. (T. 291-292.) 
5. Mrs. Turner was also a very active 
participant in the worker's compensation hearing. She was 
there for the entire hearing, offered tesitmony herself, and 
participated in her husband's testimony as well. (T. 306-307.) 
6. Inteltech conducted the investigation of Mr. 
Turner's claim from October 1986 through December 1986. 
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Inteltech representatives also offered testimony at the 
worker's compensation hearing. Mrs. Turner conceded that the 
Inteltech representatives testified honestly and truthfully at 
the worker's compensation hearing. (T. 294, 304.) 
8. Mrs. Turner was very upset at the hearing, 
however, because she believed other witnesses who had been 
called by Mr. Turner's employer had lied. (T. 286.) The 
Administrative law judge decided the hearing adversely to Mr. 
Turner, denying his claim for additional compensation. (T. 
290.) 
Investigation 
9. Inteltech's investigation of Mr. Turner 
involved six occasions on which the Turners were contacted. All 
of these contacts were handled by Ron Hyer, an Inteltech 
investigator. (T. 131.) The specific times of contact were 
delineated on Exhibit 3 and on the business records of 
Inteltech admitted as Exhibit 2. There were five visits with 
Mrs. Turner present ranging in length from 17 minutes to 34 
minutes. There was also one telephone conference with Mrs. 
Turner. The total time involved when Mr. Hyer spoke with Mrs. 
Turner was 2 hours 8 minutes. Of this time, Mr. Turner was 
present for all but 51 minutes. 
10. In accordance with company policy, Mr. Hyer 
did not introduce himself as a private investigator. His 
object was to obtain candid information. He used the cover of 
a door-to-door market testing representative. He offered the 
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Turners a number of products to test on a voluntary basis. 
They accepted and appreciated the receipt of these products. 
(T. 166.) All of the products were free to the Turners. 
11. Mr. Hyer was always friendly and courteous to 
the Turners. (T. 166, 265, 303.) Mr. Hyer never came into the 
home uninvited. (T. 161.) Mrs. Turner never requested that he 
leave or not return. (T. 302-303.) She understood that she 
did not have any obligation to continue receiving products. 
(T. 311.) 
12. The pretext of market testing was used in 
this case simply as a cover so that candid conversation could 
occur. 
Inteltech 
13. Inteltech is an investigation company formed 
by Oak Norton. It provides investigation services to insurance 
companies in investigation of questionable worker's 
compensation or liability claims. It also does undercover work 
for corporations in investigating internal theft and 
embezzlement. (T. 114.) 
14. Inteltech has previously been employed by a 
number of State and Federal agencies, including the Utah State 
Insurance Fund. (T. 101, 115, 119.) 
15. Inteltech has used the pretext of market 
testing as a cover for a number of years. Before conducting 
such investigations, it received legal advice from attorneys 
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both in its home state of Pennsylvania and in Utah indicating 
that this technique is lawful. (T. 103, 112, 118.) 
16. It is Inteltech's job when hired to do a 
pretext investigation to gather facts and if requested take 
moving pictures of a claimant. Inteltech does not make a 
recommendation regarding what should be done. (T. 123.) 
Accordingly, in this case as well, no specific recommendation 
was given, other than to report observations of Mr. Turner 
working. (T. 235.) 
17. In this particular investigation, the 
attorney involved for the company was aware and gave some 
direction regarding investigation. (T. 23 6, 237.) 
Claimed Injury 
18. Mrs. Turner made no claim of any physical 
injury resulting from this investigation. She attempted to 
make a claim of financial injury. She claimed that she was 
employed at the time of the investigation and that her 
conversations with Mr. Hyer took her away from gainful 
employment. She claimed a wage rate of $6 per hour. (T. 
272.) On cross examination, however, it was clear that Mrs. 
Turner did not have a paying job. She assisted a landlord in 
managing some apartments and received credit toward rent. (T. 
298.) She worked on a very flexible schedule. It was also 
clear that at the times Mr. Hyer met with her, she was not at 
work or leaving for work. She normally did the work for the 
landlord at night. (T. 268.) 
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19. Mrs. Turner also claimed that on one occasion 
she had lined up a babysitter anticipating a visit from Mr. 
Hyer and some more involved product testing. She did not 
identify the babysitter, she simply estimated that she paid the 
babysitter "20 bucks or something like that." (T. 272.) When 
the meeting with Mr. Hyer was cancelled, she offered no 
explanation as to why she did not cancel the babysitter. 
20. Mrs. Turner's primary claim for damages was 
for emotional distress. She claimed that the realization that 
Mr. Hyer was an investigator had caused her to feel betrayed 
and angry. (T. 274.) She claimed that she was upset 
immediately following the worker's compensastion hearing where 
she learned of Mr. Hyer's true employment. (T. 275.) 
21. This testimony was contradicted by the 
testimony of her husband, Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner testified 
that she didn't seem particularly upset or abnormal at all 
following the worker's compensation hearing when she learned of 
Mr. Hyer's involvement. To the contrary, he didn't notice an 
emotional change in her until several years after the hearing 
occurred. (T. 197-198.) 
Mrs. Turner's Credibility 
22. In addition to the conflict with her 
husband's testimony, other testimony raising questions about 
her credibility was as follows: 
a. Mrs. Turner testified repeatedly that the 
investigation by Inteltech had started much earlier 
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than the records demonstrated it had and involved 
visits of much more frequency and more duration than 
the records showed. (T. 263, 281, 295.) 
b. Mrs. Turner herself admitted that she had 
been experiencing severe psychological problems 
throughout her life which were totally unrelated to 
any investigation. Her family history includes many 
tragic episodes of rape, incest, child abuse, and 
severe marital discord. She herself testified that 
her memory was not accurate. (T. 277, 314, 316, 317.) 
c. Mrs. Turner conceded that she had falsely 
told GAB that her husband was not working when, in 
fact, he was. (T. 291-292.) 
d. Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist who 
had reviewed her psychological history, gave his 
opinion that the many stress factors in her life were 
the source of any emotional problems she was having, 
not the few visits that she had had with Mr. Hyer. 
He also pointed out that her psychiatric records 
indicated she was unable to accurately relate her 
condition and situation and accurately give 
historical information. (T. 385-389.) 
e. Dr. Rindflesh further pointed out that at 
the time of the investigation and the hearing, when 
any psychological problems should have been 
occurring, Mrs. Turner made no reference to those 
events with a therapist and, in fact, since that time 
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has never mentioned those circumstances to any of her 
several counselors. (T. 380-381.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
A JNOV MAY NOT BE GRANTED IF THERE IS ANY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT. 
A trial court may only grant a JNOV if it finds that 
there was no competent evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict. All evidence presented at trial must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party prevailing on the jury's 
verdict. 
On appeal of an order granting a JNOV, the appellate 
court must make the same analysis from the record and should 
not give deference to the determination of the trial court. As 
applied in the instant case, Judge Wilkinson's JNOV Order may 
only be upheld if there is no credible evidence whatsoever to 
suggest that plaintiff failed to prove any of the elements of 
her causes of action. 
POINT II 
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
FRAUD IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE. 
It is the plaintiff's burden in a fraud case to prove 
all of the nine elements of fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. One of the elements requires the proof of pecuniary 
injury or damage. Plaintiff's evidence of pecuniary injury in 
this case was highly deficient and suspect and certainly does 
not reach the standard of clear and convincing evidence. The 
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jury's verdict denying recovery for fraud is well supported 
based upon the lack of damage evidence. 
In addition, a review of the other elements of a 
fraud claim makes clear that this is not a case of fraud. 
While plaintiff has been able to pick certain elements of fraud 
and point to misrepresentations, this is simply not a fraud 
case. Fraud is an economic tort based upon misrepresentations 
inducing a person into a contract. There was no contract in 
this case that was not fully performed by Inteltech when it 
delivered the various free products that were promised to 
plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION 
OF PRIVACY WAS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Under the law, it is plaintiff's burden to prove that 
her privacy was invaded and that the intrusion was "substantial 
and would be highly offensive to a reasonable person". The 
jury's conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove this element 
is well supported. Plaintiff only had met with Inteltech on 
five occasions. The total time involved was 2 hours and 8 
minutes. Inteltech's representatives were at all times 
courteous and friendly. There was no harassment, disparagement 
or other abuse of any kind. There was no bugging, peeping or 
other invasions. The evidence fully supports the jury's 
conclusion that any intrusion was not highly offensive or 
substantial. Such a determination is clearly within the 
special province of a jury. 
-11-
Furthermore, the Turners, by making a worker's 
compensation claim, impliedly consented to a full and 
reasonable investigation of that claim. The jury found that 
the investigation techniques used by Inteltech were 
reasonable. There was no evidence presented to suggest a 
contrary finding. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF 
A PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM. 
Two of the essential elements to a punitive damage 
claim are: (1) Proof of malice or reckless disregard on the 
part of defendant, and (2) proof of defendant's wealth. 
Plaintiff offered no evidence to support either of these 
elements. 
Defendants' testimony was unopposed and established 
that prior to using their investigation techniques, defendants 
received opinions from several attorneys regarding the legality 
of those techniques. Those attorneys all advised that the 
techniques were appropriate and complied with the law. As 
such, defendants' actions cannot be found to be in reckless 
disregard of the law. In fact, defendants went out of their 
way to determine that their actions complied with the law. 
Furthermore, plaintiff simply failed to put on any 
evidence as to the wealth of defendants. Such evidence is a 
necessary element of any punitive damage claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION MAY NOT BE 
REVERSED BY A JNOV UNLESS THERE IS NO COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT. 
The granting of a JNOV reversing a jury's verdict is 
a drastic remedy which may only be used in the clearest of 
cases. This Court has repeatedly stated that a JNOV may only 
be granted if there is a total absence of competent evidence 
supporting the verdict. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987); Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982). 
Conversely, if any competent evidence, or reasonable inference 
from competent evidence, supports the jury's verdict, a JNOV 
should not be granted. 
As with a summary judgment motion, a JNOV motion 
raises a legal issue as to the presence or absence of any 
competent evidence supporting a particular proposition. As 
such, on appeal, the appellate court should not pay deference 
to the determination of the trial judge, but rather must make 
its own independent review of the record applying the same 
standards that should have been applied at the trial court 
level. King v. Fereday, supra. 
In the case of Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. 
Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979), this Court specifically 
cautioned against a trial court's substitution of its own 
feelings or reactions to evidence for that of the jury. The 
Court commented: 
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As we have numerous times indicated, the 
right of trial by jury is one which should 
be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and 
when a party had demanded such a trial, he 
is entitled to have the benefit of the 
jury's findings on issues of fact; and it 
is not the trial court's prerogative to 
disregard or nullify them by making 
findings of his own. Therefore, in ruling 
on the motions which take issues of fact 
from the jury (this includes both motions 
for directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict), the trial 
court is obliged to look at all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that 
fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light 
favorable to the party moved against; and 
the granting of such a motion is justified 
only if, in so viewing the evidence, there 
is no substantial basis therein which would 
support a verdict in his favor. On 
appeal, in considering the trial court's 
granting of such motions, we look at the 
evidence in the same manner. (Emphasis 
added.) 
As applied to the instant case, Judge Wilkinson's 
JNOV order may be upheld if and only if there is no credible 
evidence or question as to whether plaintiff proved all of the 
elements of her causes of action for fraud, invasion of privacy 
and punitive damages. 
POINT II 
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
FRAUD IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court has delineated the elements that must be 
shown in establishing fraud in the case of Mikkelson v. Quail 
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982) as follows: 
To maintain a cause of action for fraud, 
plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence the existence of each 
of the following elements: 
1. That a representation was made; 
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2. Concerning a presently existing 
material fact; 
3. Which was false; 
4. Which the representer either (a) 
knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which 
to base such a representation; 
5. For the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; 
6. That the other party acted 
reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; 
7. Did in fact rely upon it; 
8. Was thereby induced to act; 
9. To his injury and damage. 
In Mrs. Turner's case, several of these elements are 
lacking. Most clearly, plaintiff has not suffered any "injury 
and damage" as required for a fraud action. 
Fraud is a cause of action for economic loss, It 
compensates injured parties for out of pocket losses resulting 
from deceit. In the instant case, plaintiff's allegations are 
simply that she had conversations with Mr. Hyer when Mr. Hyer 
had misrepresented his true employment. Her allegations of 
emotional upset are insufficient to support a cause of action 
or fraud. In casting about to find some out of pocket damage, 
plaintiff's claims of the loss of $20 for a babysitter and some 
unspecified amount of income simply failed to meet the clear 
and convincing standard. 
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A. Emotional Damages Are Not Recoverable in Fraud. 
In the case of Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 682 P.2d 1247 
(Ida. 1983), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed that portion of a 
judgment which awarded damages for mental distress in a fraud 
case. The Court stated: 
The general rule is that recovery cannot 
be had for mental anguish in fraud cases. 
As stated in 37 CJS Fraud, Section 141(f) 
1943: "recovery cannot be had in an action 
for deceit for injury to plaintiff's 
feelings and public disgrace incurred 
through being deceived through false 
representations, or for anxiety, worry, and 
harrassment arising from fraud, or from 
annoyance or inconvenience." A number of 
jurisdictions follow this or a similar 
rule. See, e.g., Moore v. Slonim, 426 
F.Supp. 524 (D.C.Conn.), afffd, 562 F.2d 38 
(2nd Cir. 1977) (Damages for mental 
distress not ordinarily available in a 
cause of action for business fraud); 
Kantor v. Comet Press Books Corp., 187 
F.Supp., 321 (S.D. N.Y. 1960) (damages for 
mental anguish not recoverable in action 
for fraud); Sierra National Bank v. 
Brown, 18 Cal.App.3d 98, 95 Cal. Rptr. 742 
(1971) (mental distress not an element of 
damages for fraud); Chandler v. Ziegler, 
88 Colo. 1, 291 P.822 (1930) (instruction 
allowing inconvenience held to constitute 
reversible error); Ellis v. Crockett, 51 
Hawaii 45, 451 P.2d 814 (1969) (in cases of 
fraud, there may be no recovery for mental 
anguish or humiliation not intentionally 
inflicted); Harsche v. Czyz, 157 Neb. 
699, 61 N.W.2d 265 (1953) (in an action for 
fraud, instruction permitting recovery for 
mental anguish and humiliation constituted 
prejudicial error). 
682 P.2d at 1258-59 (Emphasis added). 
See also, Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii 
1969) upholding the dismissal of a fraud complaint seeking 
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mental suffering damages. There, the Hawaiian Supreme Court 
stated: 
In order to have a claim based on deceit, 
the plaintiff must have suffered 
substantial actual damage, not nominal or 
speculative. (Prosser, Law on Torts, at 
748, 3rd Ed. 1964.) The courts have often 
expressed this requirement in terms of 
pecuniary damage . . . 
Pecuniary damages, being narrow in scope, 
are those damages (either general or 
special, which can accurately be calculated 
in monetary terms such as loss of wages and 
cost of medical expenses. In fraud or 
deceit cases, the measure of pecuniary 
damages is usually confined to either the 
"out of pocket" loss fcitation] or the 
"benefit of the bargain" . . . 
451 P.2d at 820 (Emphasis added). 
B. Plaintiff's Damage Evidence Was Deficient. 
Damages, like all other elements of a cause of action 
for fraud are required to be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. The evidence presented by plaintiff at trial was 
anything but clear and convincing. 
Pecuniary Damage. With regard to the pecuniary 
loss plaintiff claimed, her evidence was almost non-existent. 
She alleged at various times that she had lost time from work. 
However, she was unable to put any dollar figure on the amount 
of work lost. She only said that she spent some time with Ron 
Hyer and that people at S.O.S. got $6 per hour. She failed to 
indicate how, if at all, the time she spent with Ron Hyer 
affected the rent credit that she was earning from her 
landlord. Her discussion of her various conferences with Mr. 
Hyer made clear that most if not all of them did not involve 
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loss of work, whatsoever. On one occasion, she had been 
sleeping during the day. On another occasion, she was at a 
friend's house. On several other occasions, she had young 
children home with her and clearly was not going off to do any 
work. Having failed to provide any specification of time 
involved, jobs missed, or rate of pay at any of the jobs, 
plaintiff's claims of lost income damages certainly fails the 
clear and convincing test. 
Plaintiff's other claim of pecuniary loss related to 
babysitting service. In this case, once again, she failed to 
give any specification. She failed to identify a babysitter 
whom she had paid. She also was unclear as to exactly what had 
been paid. She merely stated "2 0 bucks or something like 
that." She gave no explanation as to why, when the meeting 
with Ron Hyer was cancelled in advance, she failed to similarly 
cancel her babysitter. At best, the evidence was 
questionable. It certainly was not clear and convincing. 
Emotional Damages. If emotional damages were to be 
considered, plaintiff's testimony regarding her emotional 
damages was similarly seriously deficient. Nothwithstanding 
the fact that plaintiff was residing in a psychiatric hospital 
at the time of trial and apparently receiving regular 
psychological treatment, plaintiff failed to present a single 
psychologist, psychiatrist or therapist to explain any sort of 
emotional harm that had been caused to her by the 
investigation. Plaintiff's own description of her emotional 
reaction to the investigation was brief and unconvincing. She 
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stated simply "I felt that a friend had betrayed me. And I 
felt that my time I cherished and my hospitality had been 
violated." (T. 274.) Later, she stated she was "angry, very 
very angry" when she learned of the investigation. (T. 276.) 
The evidence was unrebutted that she had sought no 
care of any kind for her claimed emotional distress. In fact, 
although she was regularly receiving treatment from therapists 
and psychologists she had not mentioned this matter to any of 
them. None of the notes regarding her treatment made any 
reference to this investigation or her reaction to it. 
The only witness plaintiff presented in an attempt to 
corroborate any psychological injury was her husband, Mr. 
Turner. As noted in the Fact Statement, Mr. Turner was 
damaging to her allegations of emotional distress. Mr. Turner 
contradicted his wife's testimony that she had been emotionally 
distraught just after the learning of the investigation. Mr. 
Turner specifically stated that she was her normal self 
following the hearing when she learned about the 
investigation. (T. 197.) He further pointed out that she did 
not seem to have the various problems with trust and invasion 
of privacy until years after learning of the investigation. In 
summing up his testimony, Mr. Turner stated: 
QUESTION: But in the last year you have 
noticed some things? 
ANSWER: I know she don't trust nobody no 
more. 
QUESTION: And you understand that is 
related to the Industrial Commission 
hearing. 
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ANSWER: No. 
T. 199. 
C. Plaintiff Was Not Credible. 
Plaintiff's evidence supporting any emotional harm or 
pecuniary loss was scanty at best and certainly not rising to 
the level of clear and convincing. In addition, however, 
there is the issue of plaintiff's credibility. Her testimony 
conflicted with that of her husband. She also admitted that 
she had given false information to GAB about her husband's 
employment. Additionally, her testimony about the number, 
timing and duration of the visits with Ron Hyer was 
contradicted by the records. Finally, her own psychiatric 
treatment records and the analysis of Dr. Mark Rindflesh show 
that she was inaccurate in her recollections and inaccurate in 
her analysis of her emotional state. 
The jury had received Instruction No. 5 which stated: 
If you believe any witness has willfully 
testified falsely as to any material 
matter, you may disregard the entire 
testimony of such witness, except as he may 
have been corroborated by other credible 
evidence. (R. 676.) 
They also received Instruction 10 as follows: 
If you should find that it was within the 
power of a party to produce stronger and 
more satisfactory evidence than that which 
was offered on a material point, you may 
view with distrust any weaker and less 
satisfactory evidence actually offered by 
him on that point, unless such failure is 
satisfactorily explained. (R. 681.) 
Applying these two instructions, the jury's verdict 
that fraud damages were not proved by clear and convincing 
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evidence is strongly supported. There can be no doubt that 
Mrs. Turner did testify falsely with regard to some issues. 
There further can be no doubt that her evidence of damage was 
grossly inadequate. There was no reason that she could not 
have given more specific information regarding whatever 
payments and losses she claims she incurred. There similarly 
was no reason presented that she could not have brought in one 
of her treating psychiatrists to explain how this investigation 
had affected her life. The fact is that she had no such 
evidence to present. 
D. Other Necessary Factors for A Fraud Claim Were Lacking. 
In addition to the lack of damages sufficient to 
support a claim of fraud, any analysis of the remaining 
elements of fraud points out the fundamental inappropriateness 
of attempting to make a claim of fraud under these facts. Were 
the representations material? The question of materiality of 
representations in a fraud context is considered in terms of 
the inducement to enter into a transaction. See Ellis v. 
Crocket, supra. In this case, no transactions were entered 
into regarding the investigation. The only transactions were 
that Mrs. Turner was promised delivery of certain free 
products, all of which she received. Mrs. Turner received 
everything that was promised by Mr. Hyer. Using the 
transactional analysis as is appropriate for fraud, 
representations made to plaintiff regarding compensation were 
all true. 
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This case is simply not a fraud case. While 
plaintiff has been able to pick elements of fraud and point to 
misrepresentation, this is not a fraud case. Nothing was taken 
from plaintiff and no pecuniary loss is involved. Defendants 
provided free products exactly as promised. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION 
OF PRIVACY WAS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Court's instruction to the jury regarding 
invasion of privacy was based upon the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Section 652(b) and Comment D. The instruction, to 
which plaintiff took no exception, read as follows: 
In this case, the plaintiff Jackie Turner 
claims that the defendants have invaded her 
privacy. In order to find that defendants 
have invaded the plaintiff's privacy, you 
must find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that: 
1. The defendants intentionally intruded 
upon the solitude or seclusion of the 
plaintiff or her private affairs or 
concerns; and 
2. That the intrusion was substantial and 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person. 
In this case, the jury's conclusion that plaintiff 
had failed to prove invasion of privacy under this standard was 
well supported. There is substantial and credible evidence 
that the intrusion involved was not substantial and would not 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Furthermore, there 
is substantial evidence supporting the fact that Mr. and Mrs. 
Turner had jointly waived certain rights of privacy to the 
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extent of a reasonable investigation of the worker's 
compensation claim. 
A. Any Intrusion was Insubstantial and Not Highly Offensive. 
Although plaintiff testified at trial that she was 
visited 10 to 15 times by Mr. Hyer, that testimony was directly 
contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Hyer and Inteltech's 
business records. The Inteltech records showed that Mrs. 
Turner only met on five occasions with Mr. Hyer. There was 
also one brief phone call. The total time Mrs. Turner spent 
with Mr. Hyer was 2 hours and 8 minutes. During all but two of 
the visits, Mr. Turner was present as well. 
On each occasion, Mr. Hyer had been invited into the 
home either by Mrs. Turner or a member of her family. Each 
visit was cordial and friendly. Mr. Hyer never insisted on 
staying after being asked to leave, nor did he act in any way 
other than a courteous and friendly manner. Those visits which 
were at Mrs. Turner's home occurred in her front room or 
kitchen. She received a number of free products in connection 
with the visits. There were no late-night visits, no 
late-night telephone calls—nothing calculated to harass or 
annoy whatsoever. 
The jury evidently concluded that these few visits of 
short duration were not a substantial instrusion. Furthermore, 
they would not be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person. 
The issues of reasonableness and the degree of 
intrusion are clearly issues of fact within the special 
province of the jury. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 
-23-
P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989). The jury brings to the issue of the 
degree of offensiveness and the degree of any intrusion the 
unique perspective of eight individuals from the community 
acting as reasonable persons. The jury in this case was 
unanimous. Judge Wilkinson's substitution of his personal 
thoughts towards these jury issues cannot be supported under 
these circumstances. The contacts between Mr. Hyer and 
plaintiff are simply too few and minor and inoffensive to 
justify ignoring the unanimous decision of eight jurors. 
B. Waiver. 
When a person such as Mr. Turner makes a claim for 
worker's compensation benefits, he impliedly consents to a full 
investigation of the claim. This includes more than just 
interviewing the claimant as to his side of the story and his 
evaluation of his own injuries. Case law makes clear that the 
company has the right to place the claimant under surveillance 
and to make reasonable investigation. Ellenberg v. 
Pinckerton's, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. App. 1972); 62 
Am.Jur.2d, Privacy, § 41; and Forster v. Manchester, 180 A.2d 
147 (Penn. 1963). 
In the Forster case, for example, plaintiff claimed 
that an investigation in which she was filmed violated her 
rights to privacy. Plaintiff had become aware of the 
investigation while it was ongoing and was disturbed by it. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's claim, 
commenting: 
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. . . We feel that there is much social 
utility to be gained from these 
investigations. It is in the best interest 
of society that valid claims be ascertained 
and fabricated claims be exposed. 
* * * 
Although we sympathize with the plight of 
the appellant, the social value resulting 
from the investigations of personal injury 
claims and the absence of any wilfullness 
on the part of appellee require us to deny 
redress in this case. 
189 A.2d at 150, 152. 
Plaintiff herself recognizes that such investigations 
can be appropriate. (T. 276.) The expert plaintiff presented 
as a witness in this case similarly acknowledged that 
surveillance is an appropriate technique for an insurance 
company and further that he himself had recommended 
surveillance in certain cases. (Testimony, LeRoy Johnson, T. 
247.) The validity of any investigation or surveillance 
necessarily relies upon candid observation and responses. As 
pointed out by Ron Hyer, a private investigator seeking candid 
observations cannot inform the claimant that he is being 
observed. (T. 181-182.) 
In this case, plaintiff argued that she was not the 
claimant on the worker's compensation matter and, therefore, 
had waived nothing. This was apparently the basis for Judge 
Wilkinson's decision to overturn the jury verdict. (T. of H., 
20.) 
The facts, however, do not support this position. 
Although Mrs. Turner was not the direct worker's compensation 
claimant, she clearly had a personal and financial interest in 
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the claim. She was acting as her husband's advisor in filing 
the claim and in working with the various insurance adjusters. 
She personally went down to receive money from GAB on the 
claim. She personally gave GAB information which she hoped 
supported the claim. She personally filled out the original 
claim form itself. 
It is simply not possible to investigate a claim 
being made by a spouse in a household and not at the same time 
have some contact or observation of other persons residing in 
that household. Mrs. Turner was a very significant part of of 
the worker's compensation claim as well as her husband. The 
fact that the investigator had some insubstantial contact with 
her while investigating Mr. Turner does not justify overturning 
the jury's verdict. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
A. Defendant Acted in Good Faith and With 
Concern for the Rights of Others. 
This action arose before the passage of Section 
78-18-1, Utah Code Annotated. Accordingly, the issue of 
punitive damages was determined under common law as existing 
prior to the passage of Section 78-18-1. 
Case law permits the awarding of punitive damages 
only in a case where the defendant's conduct "is willful and 
malicious or manifests a knowing and reckless disregard toward 
and disregard of, the rights of others. Johnson v. Rogers, 
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763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). In this case, there was no evidence 
supporting a finding of malice or such reckless indifference. 
There was no suggestion in the evidence of any malice 
or ill will carried by any defendant regarding Mrs. Turner or 
her husband. To the contrary, all contacts were pleasant and 
friendly. None of the Inteltech people had any previous 
knowledge or acquaintance with the Turners. 
In addition, there was no evidence whatsoever of a 
reckless indifference towards Mrs. Turner's rights. The 
testimony of Oak Norton was unopposed regarding the legal 
advice he had sought and received prior to utilizing the 
investigation techniques involved. Mr. Norton consulted with 
attorneys in the State of Pennsylvania and Utah. He further 
was aware of legal review being made by various clients. 
Finally, in many cases, as in this one, the individual attorney 
involved in the worker's compensation hearing was fully aware 
of the investigation technique and apparently approved it. 
Inteltech's obtaining legal opinion as to the techniques it 
used cannot be considered "reckless". To the contrary, its 
conduct was proper and appropriate in making efforts to check 
out the legal ramifications of its procedures before engaging 
in them. 
B. Plaintiff Failed to Offer Evidence 
of the Wealth of Defendants. 
In addition, plaintiff failed to present evidence of 
the relative wealth of the various defendants. Such evidence 
is a part of the case a plaintiff must present in a punitive 
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damage action. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co, v. Shettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). 
In the instant case, plaintiff failed to put on any 
evidence as to the net worth or net income of any of the 
defendants. In view of this failure of evidence, punitive 
damages cannot be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Following trial in this case, the jury returned a 
unanimous verdict of no cause of action. It found that no 
fraud had been committed and that there was no actionable 
invasion of privacy. That verdict may only be overturned if 
there is no competent evidence or inference from competent 
evidence to support it. A review of the transcript makes clear 
that there was more than adequate evidence to support the 
jury's determination. This determination involves questions of 
reasonableness and outrageousness which are properly determined 
by a jury. Judge Wilkinson's granting of the JNOV motion was 
an inappropriate rejection of the jury's deliberation. Under 
the standards established by this Court, it cannot be upheld. 
This Court should reverse the Judge's JNOV Order and 
remand the matter to the District Court with directions to 
enter judgment of no cause of action in accord with the jury's 
verdict. 
DATED this 27 '"day of / - lUrtA , 1991. 
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23 THE COURT: Okay. Ifm ready to rule. 
24 Let me state this to you: As I indicated at 
25 the outset, of course, as you know, I heard the 
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evidence. And I had feelings at the time and I have 
feelings. And I have reviewed this matter, and I was 
more versed on the evidence right after the trial than I 
am now; but I have reviewed it. In fact, I got before 
me the instructions that were given to the jury. 
And I understand what you1re arguing and the 
seriousness of what I am about to do. And it seems 
like that I can only remember one other case where I 
have really modified a juryfs verdict, and that also 
involved Mr. Schwab. I got myself in a little hot water 
on it, too, because I didn't review it that well. 
But anyway, the Court is of the opinion that 
the motion by the plaintiff for a Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict is well taken. That I am of 
the opinion that no reasonable minds could have differed 
on the evidence which was presented to them. That I am 
basing this on that Jackie Turner is not an individual 
that's involved as far as the defendants are concerned 
-- and I made this statement at trial a couple of times 
-- as far as the defendants are concerned in making a 
determination as to whether she is dishonest in 
accepting money under an industrial claim. That she was 
not the person in that situation; she was the wife. And 
it was highly offensive to this Court for the defendants 
to do what they did to Jackie Turner. 
20 
The Court 
and I can go through 
finds that all of the elements --
-- you are going to have to prepare 
some findings of facts, but I can go through each one; I 
am not going to just 
insists on it -- I am 
fraud were met. That 
$20 was testified to. 
to save time unless somebody 
saying that all nine elements of 
the Court was of the opinion that 
That there was a lot of argument 
on it but there was no strong cross examination that 
that money was never 
And I will 
spent by her. 
admit that other things were said 
as far as time and things are concerned of which the 
Court is not basing it on. I think that is too 
speculative, although 
Anybodyfs time is of 
| argument as far as I 
$20 was there. 
| The Court 
elements of invasion 
defendants intentiona 
solitude of the plain 
affairs are concerned 
I think her time was taken. 
some value, so you can't make an 
am concerned. But I am saying that 
is also of the opinion that the 
of privacy are there. That the 
lly intruded upon the privacy and 
tiff, and as far as her private 
And the intrusion was 
substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable 
person. And that I am also of the opinion -- and I 
don't know that this 
that the elements of 
is really before me at this time --
conspiracy were proven as far as, I 
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guess, Inteltech and GAB. 
And based on that, I am going to deny the 
motion for a new trial. But I am going to grant to the 
plaintiff out-of-pocket damages of $20, general damages 
of $5,000, punitive damages of $3,000, together with 
reasonable attorney fees. 
Now, I have not gone into or said anything 
about the agency concern. And I donft know if that's 
something that I need to go into. 
MR. BARLOW: Well, your Honor, there was no 
finding at all as to GAB. Is this verdict that you have 
just rendered against both defendants? 
THE COURT: Well, I guess that's what I was 
asking. 
MR. BARLOW: There was no fraud claim or 
invasion of privacy against GAB. There was only a 
conspiracy claim, which the Court has noted was not 
before the Court on this motion, nor was it even reached 
by the jury. So I don't know that the Court can enter 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict since there was no 
verdict on conspiracy. 
THE COURT: What did happen to the conspiracy? 
MR. BARLOW: It was never reached because it 
only could be obtained if there was a finding of fraud 
or invasion of privacy. That was a prerequisite 
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MR. JENSEN: Maybe we can resolve that, your 
Honor. The reason that the conspiracy claim -- the way 
that the special verdict read is that any liability of 
GAB would be based on the underlying wrongful act of 
invasion of privacy or fraud. Since the jury found that 
neither one of those have been established, that the 
question of conspiracy we didn't reach it. 
We can probably resolve that if the plaintiff 
were willing to voluntarily dismiss the claim of 
conspiracy against GAB. I would simply just have to 
talk to my client about that. 
I think I could say if that claim of 
conspiracy, and we agree that the conspiracy claim 
against GAB might be dismissed — I don't know if 
Inteltech would agree to that; I think they would have 
an opportunity if they wanted to bring GAB back in for a 
determination of whether or not GAB is at all on the 
hook for any of this $8,000 -- but I think our position 
would be under the circumstances that we would dismiss, 
based on the Court's rulings, dismiss the claim against 
GAB for conspiracy and simply move to collect the 
judgment against Inteltech. 
MR. BARLOW: Well, are you moving for that 
now? 
MR. JENSEN: I can't do that without talking 
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to my client. 
MR. BARLOW: I am requesting for a ruling 
right now. 
THE COURT: I'm making a ruling. I am 
to rule this way: As I say -- first of all, let 
back. I donft remember completely the motion for 
directed verdict. I remember I took two motions 
advisement. I took them under advisement because 
of the opinion there was no way the jury cannot f 
those matters. But I got surprised. And maybe I 
shouldn't. Maybe I should have ruled at the time 
didn't. 
I am of the opinion, and I am going to 
this -- and maybe you can state some law and I am 
and you'll have to revise it -- but I am of the o 
that there was conspiracy. That the elements of 
going 
me go 
a 
under 
I was 
ind on 
, but I 
state 
wrong 
pinion 
conspiracy were met as far as the five elements set 
forth in the jury instructions are concerned. I am of 
the opinion that Oak Norton, himself, he knew what his 
individuals were doing, his employees were doing. 
he approved it. And that he, himself, could even 
personally liable. 
I am convinced that Inteltech was the 
-- or was it the other way around? Yeah. Intelt 
the agent of GAB and GAB indicated that they knew 
And 
be 
agent 
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past summer on that. 
If it only goes to bad faith, I 
myself because I did not review 
this was a highly offensive 
erson is entitled to attorney 
attorney fees are not pled for and 78-, 
whatever it is, only 
deny myself and deny 
request made : 
MR. 
for them 
STEVENS 
there is to be a new 
THE 
new trial. 
MR. 
COURT: 
BARLOW: 
$3,000 punitive damag 
$20 of special damage 
defendants? 
THE COURT: 
goes to bad faith, I would have to 
attorney fees since there is no 
• 
So is the order of the Court 
trial? 
No. I am denying the motion for a 
May I also understand again the 
es and $5,000 general damages and 
s are to be paid by both 
I am not making that 
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25 
determination 
the evidence. 
conspiracy is 
agency, then : 
my < 
cli( 
the 
MR. 
client wou. 
ents would 
THE 
I am 
The wa 
, the wa 
E think 
STEVENS 
ruling and ordering how I looked at 
y the evidence is, the way the 
y that I found that there 
the chips fall where they 
was an 
do. 
Are you saying, your Honor, that 
Id owe those amounts and that Mr. Barlow f s 
also owe those amounts, double recovery? 
COURT: 
total amount. 
MR. 
THE 
that. 
MR. 
BARLOW: 
COURT: 
BARLOW: 
No, no. This is joint. 
So it is joint? 
That's 
Oh, yes, if you are asking me 
I am trying to understand if 
1 between the two defendants we owe these damages. 
you 
is ' 
it, 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
have also 
COURT: 
BARLOW: 
COURT: 
STEVENS 
Yes. 
According to the Court's 
Yes. 
i order. 
And if I understand correctly, 
included Oak Norton individually 
that correct? 
THE COURT: 
$8,000 total -- a 
knew what was 
and 
I say that Oak Norton --
nd that Oak Norton I said 
going on as far as his employees 
making those fraudulent misrepresentations. 
Any other questions? 
on that; 
all of 
that he 
going out 
28 
1 I didn*'t understand your question, 
2 Mr. Barlow, when you said each one of you. No, I am not 
3 saying that. 
4I Okay. Court's in recess. 
5 (This concludes these proceedings.) 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
* * * 
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- C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify 
5 that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered 
6 Professional Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and 
7 Notary Public in and for the State of Utah. 
8 That at the time and place of the proceedings 
9 in the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court 
10 reporter in the Third Judicial District Court, for the 
11 Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported 
12 in stenotype all of the proceedings had therein; 
13 That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of 
14I the Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict and 
15 for a New Trial were transcribed by computer into the 
16 foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true 
17 and correct transcript of the same. 
18 WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
19 City, Utah, this 30th day of May, 1990. 
20 
IdJE^jLCjOk 2i I ^J\M2£L4UaJL~. 
Suzan/tjft Warnick , CSR, RPR-CM 
22 ' 
23 
24 , 
My commission expires: 
25 I 1 April 1991. 
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ADDENDUM: B 
GORDON K. JENSEN - A4J5 3 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACKIE TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; 
DENNIS DYE; RONNIE HYER; 
OAK NORTON, INTELDEX 
CORPORATION, d/b/a 
Intel tech Services; 
Defendants. 
This case was tried to a jury on March 12-14, 1990 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. Before trial, the 
plaintiff James Turner voluntarily dismissed all claims against 
all defendants. During trial, the plaintiff Jackie Turner 
dismissed her claims against Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in 
their individual capacities. During trial, Oak Norton 
dismissed his counterclaim ayainst James Turner and Jackie 
Turner. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, 
finding no fraud and no invasion of privacy. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-5401 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict and Motion for A New Trial came before the Court 
for hearing on May 4, 1990. Gordon K. Jensen represented the 
plaintiff. Craig L. Barlow represented the defendant General 
Adjustment Bureau ("GAB") and Robert L. Stevens and Michael L. 
Schwab represented the defendants Inteltech and Oak Norton. 
Based on the evidence at trial, the pleadings on file, the 
arguments of the parties, the stipulations of the parties 
before and during trial, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiff James Turner's claims against all 
defendants are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 
stipulation; 
2. The plaintiff Jackie Turner's claims against 
Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in their individual capacities, are 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation; 
3. The defendant Oak Norton's counterclaim against 
James Turner and Jackie Turner is dismissed with prejudice 
pursuant to stipulation; 
4. The plaintiff Jackie Turner's Motion for a New 
Trial is denied; 
5. The plaintiff Jackie Turner's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is granted. Judgment is 
2 
entered against Inteltech on Jackie Turner's fraud and invasion 
of privacy claims as follows: 
Out-of-Pocket Damages $ 20.00 
General Damages 5,000.00 
Punitive Damages 3,000 . 00 
TOTAL $ 8,020.00 
6. Judgment is entered against Inteltech and GAB on 
Jackie Turner's conspiracy claim. Inteltech and GAB are 
jointly responsible to Jackie Turner for the amount of this 
Judgment. 
7. Oak Norton is personally liable to Jackie Turner 
for the amount of this Judgment. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded post judgment interest 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, accruing at a rate of 12% 
per annum. 
9. The plaintiff is awarded her costs of court as 
determined pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. A * s ^ ^ _ _ 
DATED this JL / day eft May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM: C 
iL' 
ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105] 
MICHAEL L. SCHWAB [A4662] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES TURNER and JACKIE TURNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., 
DENNIS DYE, RONNIE HYER, OAK 
NORTON, INTELDEX CORPORATION, 
dba INTELTECH SERVICES, 
Defendants, 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. C87-5401 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
This action came on for trial March 12-14, 1990, 
before the Court and a jury, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
presiding. Prior to trial, plaintiff James Turner voluntarily 
dismissed all claims against all defendants. During trial, 
plaintiff Jackie Turner dismissed her claims against Dennis 
Dye and Ronnie Hyer, and Oak Norton voluntarily dismissed 
his counterclaim against James Turner and Jackie Turner. 
The issues were duly tried and the jury answered the 
special verdict submitted to it as follows: 
1. By clear and convincing evidence did 
the defendant Inteltech commit fraud 
upon the plaintiff, Jackie Turner, 
as that cause of action has been 
explained in these instructions? 
Yes No ^ 
By a preponderance of the evidence, 
did the defendant Inteltech invade 
the privacy of the plaintiff, Jackie 
Turner, as that cause of action has 
been explained in these instructions? 
Yes No X 
The issues in this case having been duly tried and 
the jury having rendered its verdict, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff James Turner's claims against 
all defendants be dismissed with prejudice pursuant 
to stipulation; 
2. That plaintiff Jackie Turner's claims 
against Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in their 
individual capacity, be dismissed with prejudice 
pursuant to stipulation; 
3. That defendant Oak Norton's counterclaim 
against James and Jackie Turner be dismissed with 
prejudice pursuant to stipulation; and 
4. That Jackie Turner's claims against all 
remaining defendants be dismissed as no cause of 
a c t i n n H i I In i HI ( j m l 1 r e .ill in I  i HI I 1  111 > H I P I J t »
 p i i n I I h , i I 
t h e d e t e n d a i i t s r e c o v e r from tli»j> p l a i n t i l t J a c k i e 
Turner, t h e i r c o s t s of a c t i o n . 
DATED t h i s 2!lLZ day <: >f S r e e k , 1 9 9 0 
BY THE COURT: 
